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HALLORAN v. VIRGINIA CHEMICALS, INC.:
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HABIT EVIDENCE IN
NEW YORK TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE
Frank and Barbara Halloran brought this personal injury suit
against Virginia Chemicals after a can of Freon packaged by the de-
fendant inexplicably exploded. The accident occurred at the Hillcrest
Service Station where Frank Halloran, an experienced automobile
mechanic,1 was employed. His duties included servicing and charging
automobile air-conditioning units. Halloran had installed a new air-
conditioning compressor on a 1967 Chrysler and had begun to charge
the unit. The first two cans of the refrigerant, Freon, flowed into the
system easily, but the third can did not flow as quickly and required
acceleration. Halloran testified that he filled an empty coffee tin with
warm tap water, used a thermometer to determine that the water
temperature was between 900 and 1000 Fahrenheit, and then inserted
the third can of Freon into the coffee tin. He testified on direct ex-
amination that this technique was his regular practice when using
Freon.2 When he encountered the same problem with the fourth can
of Freon, he dropped it into the water to accelerate its flow. Halloran
noticed that the pressure gauge registered a rapid increase in pressure
upon the immersion of the fourth can. Realizing that "something was
wrong," he attempted to remove the can from the water;3 but before
he could reach it, the can exploded and injured Halloran. Since Hal-
loran was alone at the time of the explosion, he was the only eyewitness
to the accident.
On cross-examination Halloran denied ever using an immersion
coil to heat the water in the coffee tin. The defendant, however, offered
a witness who would testify that he had seen Halloran use an immer-
sion coil on several occasions and that he had warned him of the
danger of explosion if the Freon overheated. Defendant was trying to
impeach plaintiff's credibility as a witness by establishing that plaintiff
had lied about never using a heating coil. Defendant was also trying to
establish that an act not attributable to the defendant may have caused
the explosion. Halloran objected to the admissibility of this testimony
on the ground that prior use of an immersion coil was a collateral
1. Frank Halloran has been an automobile mechanic since 1955. According to his
testimony, he has serviced "hundreds" of air-conditioning units and used "thousands"
of cans of Freon.
2. 41 N.Y.2d 386, 393, 361 N.E.2d 991, 996, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 347 (1977).
3. Id. at 390, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
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issue, and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to impeach a witness
on collateral matters. The trial judge agreed, sustained Halloran's ob-
jection and excluded the testimony. The jury rendered a verdict in
plaintiff's favor, and the appellate division, with two justices dissent-
ing, affirmed the trial court's exclusion of testimony concerning Hal-
loran's previous use of an immersion coil.4 Both courts had assumed
that the evidence would not be admissible on another ground-that
of using prior instances of carelessness to create an inference that a
person was careless on a particular occasionY There was no indication
that defendant sought to have the evidence admitted on this ground
either. Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed, holding that evidence of habit may be used to infer negli-
gence on a particular occasion. The court also held that plaintiff's use
of an immersion coil was a material issue in the case. The court of
appeals remitted the case for a new trial in which the evidence will be
admissible to infer that Halloran used an immersion coil on the day
of the accident, but only if the defendant offers sufficient evidence to
warrant a finding that Halloran's use of the coil was so regular as to
constitute a habit. Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d
386, 361 N.E.2d 991, 398 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1977).
The probative value of habit evidence stems from the likelihood
that one who has demonstrated a consistent response under specific
circumstances will repeat that response when again faced with those
circumstances. 6 New York courts have generally admitted habit evi-
dence to show that a person acted in accordance with that habit on a
specific occasion,7 but have not admitted evidence of the habit in a
civil case to infer the presence or absence of negligence on a specific
4. 50 A.D.2d 852, 377 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1975).
5. 41 N.Y.2d at 389, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
6. For a detailed rationale of habit evidence, see generally Lewan, The Rationale
of Habit Evidence, 16 SYRACUSE L. RFV. 39 (1964).
7. In re Kellum, 52 N.Y. 517 (1873) (An attorney's testimony of his uniform
custom of drafting and executing wills was admissible to prove that he had executed the
will in issue according to his habit, even though he had drafted it eleven years earlier
and had no recollection of it at the time of trial); Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. 375 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1810) (Notary's testimony that it was his consistent practice to send notice to
the endorsor of a protested bill on the evening of the day of the protest was sufficient
to support the averment of due notice having been given to the defendant in this case.
Although not supported by his memory of the specific notice in issue, the notary's testi-
mony as to his habit was admissible to prove that he had posted notice to the defendant).
Contra, Dubois v. Baker, 30 N.Y. 355 (1864) (Evidence of the defendant's habit of
carrying an inkstand was not admissible to show that he had one with him on the day
the note was drawn.
[H]is habit to have one was not legal evidence that he had one at that time.
It is not as convincing proof of the fact, as evidence of the habit of a usurer to
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occasion. 8 In contrast, if the habit is in one's business or profession 9
it has generally been admissible, but not if there was an eyewitness
to the act.10
take usury, is that a contract made by him is usurious; and evidence of such
a habit has been held to be incompetent.
Id. at 369 (Mullin, J., dissenting)).
8. Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912); Eppendorf v. Brooklyn
City & N. R.R., 69 N.Y. 195 (1877); Warner v. New York Cent. R.R., 44 N.Y. 465
(1871).
9. Beakes v. Da Cunha, 126 N.Y. 293, 27 N.E. 251, 12 N.Y.S. 351 (1891); Inre
Kellum, 52 N.Y. 517 (1873); People v. Bombard, 5 A.D.2d 923, 172 N.Y.S.2d 1,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 849 (1958); People v. Bean, 284 A.D. 922, 134 N.Y.S.2d 483
(1954); Lisanti v. William F. Kenny Co., Inc., 225 A.D. 129, 232 N.Y.S. 103 (1928),
aff'd, 250 N.Y. 621, 166 N.E. 347 (1929); People v. Mavis, 5 Misc. 2d 943, 154
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 6 Cow. 90 (N.Y. 1826);
Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
10. Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912.). Plaintiff's intestate
was struck and killed by a trolley car. Plaintiff had the burden of furnishing some
evidence that decedent had exercised some care in attempting to cross the track. Four
eyewitnesses to the accident testified rather uniformly that plaintiff had not appeared
to exercise caution at the crossing. Id. at 55-56, 98 N.E. at 210. Plaintiff offered in evi-
dence the testimony of a witness who had known the decedent for eight years, and during
that time had often walked with him through the streets of New York. The witness was
willing to testify to decedent's habit of carefully crossing railroad tracks: "When we were
about to cross railroad tracks, he usually looked to the right and to the left of him
and put a restraining hand on my arm before crossing, to make sure that there were
no vehicles of any kind coming." Id. at 59, 98 N.E. at 211. Defendant objected. The
court stated that:
[t]he weight of authority seems to be against admitting evidence of general
conduct under proven circumstances to show conduct of the same kind under
similar circumstances on a particular occasion, when there were eye-witnesses
of the occurrence, including the person injured if he survived the accident.
We are not now called upon to decide whether evidence of the habits of a de-
cedent in crossing railroads is competent when there is no eye-witness of the
event.
Id. at 64-65, 98 N.E. at 213 (emphasis added).
Eyewitness testimony is superior to habit evidence because its probative value de-
rives from personal observation of the actual occurrence. In comparison, the probative
value of habit evidence derives from mere probability, i.e., that because the act in question
has been a predictable or consistent response in given circumstances, it was probably the
response in the given circumstances in issue.
Cf. Gibson v. Casein Mfg. Co., 157 A.D. 46, 141 N.Y.S. 887 (1913); Parsons
v. Syracuse B. & N.Y. R.R., 205 N.Y. 226, 99 N.E. 331 (1912). Judge Kellogg in
Gibson interpreted Parsons as holding that evidence of habit is also inadmissible where
there are no eyewitnesses to the occurrence. However, the court in Parsons distinguishes
the evidence offered in it from the evidence offered in Zucker, describing the Zucker evi-
dence as "more direct than (the evidence) here presented." Id. at 229, 98 N.E. at 332. In
Zucker, the evidence of decedent's care in crossing railroad tracks was specific; the friend's
testimony went directly to Zucker's habit of carefully crossing tracks, his looking both ways
and his placing a restraining hand on the friend's arm. The evidence in Parsons was simply
testimony in general terms that the decedent was a man of prudent character, well ac-
quainted with the crossing, and that a few moments before the accident was conducting
himself and managing his horse in a careful, prudent manner. This evidence is not equiva-
lent to the more specific evidence offered in Zucker; it applies only to decedent's general
character, and should have been inadmissible as character evidence offered in a civil
case when character was not formally in issue.
19781
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How the court defines habit will greatly affect admissibility. Dean
Wigmore defines habit for evidentiary purposes as conduct "involving
an invariable regularity of action."" Strict adherence to this definition
avoids confusing habit for evidentiary purposes with habits in the
colloquial sense. Since few human actions are invariably regular, many
offers of habit evidence are excluded because they fail to achieve the
status of habit, either because of insufficient number or regularity, 12 or
the variable nature of the act or the circumstances surrounding it.
For example, the propensity to drink heavily, although colloquially
known as a "habit," has not been accorded the status of habit for evi-
dentiary purposes; evidence or proof of a person's intemperate be-
havior on previous occasions has not been admissible to show that the
person was intoxicated at the time of the incident in issue. 13 Nor has
evidence of a party's frequent intemperate behavior been admissible to
raise the inference -that the party was negligent on the occasion in
issue.14 This evidence is excluded because it does not meet the defi-
nitional standard of habit-a repeated response to particular cir-
11. 1 WIGIORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 92, 520 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Yarmove v. Robinson, 3 A.D.2d 864, 161 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1957). On the fact
issue of whether appellant Yarmove had been employed as a broker by respondents,
testimony by respondent that he had prepared or assisted in the preparation of about 40
contracts involving real estate and corporate transactions, and that, in the transactions
in which there was a broker, he had always either named the broker or had a separate
letter of agreement with him "fell far short of establishing a habit or custom on re-
spondent Robinson's part with respect to contracts involving brokers ... " Id. at 865,
161 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
13. See People v. Holliday, 38 N.Y.2d 763, 343 N.E.2d 770, 381 N.Y.S.2d 53
(1975) (evidence of prior instances of intemperance could not be considered in deter-
mining whether defendant had the requisite intent or was in an intoxicated condition
at the time of the stabbing); Del Toro v. Carroll, 33 A.D.2d 160, 306 N.Y.S.2d 95
(1969) (admission of portions of hospital records showing two prior incidents of intoxi-
cation of driver of automobile offered and admitted so that jury could infer that driver
was intoxicated at time of accident was prejudicial and a new trial was ordered);
Kowalczyk v. Krum, 19 A.D.2d 803, 243 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1963) (prejudicial error found
in allowing testimony concerning injured plaintiff's arrests and convictions for intoxica-
tion in past years offered to show that plaintiff was drunk when he ran into path of
the car); McQuage v. City of New York, 285 A.D. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1954)
(proof of injured plaintiff's intoxication on prior occasions inadmissible to prove he
was intoxicated at the time of the accident even though the attending physician had
diagnosed delirium tremens some hours after the accident and plaintiff had admitted
to having had "a couple of drinks" that day).
14. CIeghorn v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R., 56 N.Y. 44 (1874); Warner v. N.Y. Cent.
R.R., 44 N.Y. 465 (1871); Senecal v. Thousand Islands Steamboat Co., 79 Hun 574,
29 N.Y.S. 884 (Sup. Ct. 1894). However, evidence that an employee who, known to
the defendant employer, had intemperate "habits" was held admissible on the issue of
defendant's liability in negligence for exemplary damages claimed by an injured plain-
tiff when the employee's intoxication at the time of the accident had been established
in fact by other evidence. Cleghorn v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R., 56 N.Y. 44 (1874).
[Vol. 27
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cumstances. Furthermore, some habit evidence might unfairly preju-
dice the jury against the person about whom it is offered. Even if
highly probative, the evidence is properly excluded when there is a
strong risk that -the jury will base its verdict on evidence unrelated to
the actual controversy.
It is important to distinguish evidence of habit, which is gen-
erally admissible in civil cases, from evidence of character, which is
not.1r Character is more general than habit. It is a composite of per-
sonal traits describing one's disposition either generally or in respect
to a trait. In contrast, a habit is specific; it is the repeated, automatic
or semiautomatic response under given circumstances that is so regu-
lar as to be almost predictable. Unless character is in issue,1 character
evidence that attempts to prove how a person acted on a specific oc-
casion is prohibited in civil cases.'7 This prohibition has three goals:
to avoid possible prejudice against a party, to eliminate the waste of
court time in proving the offers of character evidence, and to prevent
distraction of the trier of fact.'
Activities exercised in the course of one's business or profession
are more likely to be characterized as habit than are non-business acts.
Although evidence of habit in business is admittedly based on per-
sonal acts, the routine elements are emphasized. In part, the probative
value of such evidence comes from the frequency of its performance
in the course of business. Further, the danger of prejudice against a
person is not likely to be created in these cases.' 9 Consequently, the
protective purpose of the prohibition of character evidence in civil
cases (i.e., to protect persons from being judged on their general char-
acter rather than on their actual behavior) is inapposite. The pro-
bative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of possible preju-
dice, and thus the evidence of the business habit is admissible.
15. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at §92.
16. Defamation and slander are two examples of suits in which the character of
one of the parties is directly in issue.
17. Noonan v. Luther, 206 N.Y. 105, 108, 99 N.E. 178, 179 (1912) (error com-
mitted by trial judge in his permitting witnesses to testify to plaintiff's good habits, that
"she never went out nor drank anything"); Engel v. United Traction Co., 203 N.Y. 321,
96 N.E. 731 (1911) (Negligence of defendant was determinable from the facts causing
the accident. An act of defendant motorman subsequent to and dissociated from the
facts causing the accident was wholly incompetent and immaterial. Nor did the foolish-
ness or immorality of the act which caused defendant motorman's discharge tend to
prove that he negligently caused the accident in issue. The general rule stated was that
the character of a party or witness in a civil cause cannot be used as evidence that he
did or did not do an act charged.)
18. FED. R. Evm. 404 (Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 404).
19. See note 9 supra.
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Unlike the business sphere where habit and character are easily
discernible, there is a fine line between habit and character evidence
in the non-business sphere. In the non-business sphere, the habit evi-
dence relates to the acts of a person rather than to the routine opera-
tion of a business. A major objection to the admission of evidence of
any personal habit outside the business sphere is its similarity to char-
acter evidence, admission of which would violate the well-established
rule excluding character evidence in civil suits.
The degree of care that a person exercises in a particular situation
is arguably a function of his character. At the same time, an individu-
al's careful or careless responses to certain circumstances may be suffi-
ciently numerous and invariably regular as to constitute a habit. Based
partially on the rule against admitting character evidence in civil cases,
New York courts have held consistently that evidence of "habits" in
respect to use of care20 is inadmissible in negligence cases to raise the
inference that the person exercised his habitual care on a specific oc-
casion.21 Further support for the exclusion of habit evidence of one's
20. Habits in respect to use of care include habits involving both carefulness and
carelessness.
21. "Habits" is in quotes to indicate that the evidence referred to as habit evidence
in at least two of these cases is arguably not evidence of invariable regularity, as habit
is defined in this Note. However, the cases are cited in support of the principle that
in negligence cases New York courts have been unwilling to admit habit evidence if it is
offered to show that the person exercised the same amount of carefulness or carelessness
on a specific occasion, since each cited case vocalizes this principle. See Zucker v. Whit-
ridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912). Evidence of decedent's careful manner of
crossing tracks offered through the testimony of an old friend of decedent's and based
upon his and decedent's many walks together was not sufficient evidence to constitute
a habit of invariable regularity in terms of decedent's manner of crossing railroad tracks.
There was no indication of the number of times decedent and witness crossed tracks
together. Second, given the number of potential variables involved in crossing tracks,
e.g., weather conditions, speed of train and time of day, it would be difficult to con-
ceive of the possibility of a substantial number of track crossings under similar cir-
cumstances necessary to establish an invariably regular pattern of conduct. However, if
this evidence were sufficient to constitute habit evidence, the habit it would establish
would be decedent's habit of crossing the tracks when he was with his friend, and not be
probative of his actions when he was alone. Habit evidence has probative value only
when it is carefully circumscribed to repeated conduct under similar circumstances. The
friend's presence is sufficient alteration of the circumstances as to render the offered
"habitual" conduct of Zucker irrelevant to the facts of the accident in issue. Eppendorf
v. Brooklyn City & N. R.R., 69 N.Y. 195 (1877).
The offer of defendant's counsel to show that plaintiff was in the habit
of jumping on defendant's cars when in motion was properly excluded.... It
was not offered to show that the plaintiff was generally careless or reckless, and
if it had been, it would have been incompetent. The simple fact that he was
in the habit of jumping upon moving cars could have no bearing in this case.
The sole question to be determined here, so far as relates to plaintiff's alleged
contributory negligence, was the character of the plaintiff's acts under the
circumstances existing at the time; and what he may have done at some other
time under other circumstances, could have no bearing upon that question.
[Vol. 27
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care has been that such evidence greatly complicates and prolongs the
trial, and may create prejudice.
If a party is attempting to use a habit as an alibi or defense, there
must be an absence of volition in the party's performance of -the act.22
The "invariable" requirement of habit evidence is strictly enforced in
such cases to prevent a party from establishing a "habit" and then con-
sciously using it defensively.2 The probative value of habit evidence
comes from the invariable nature of the underlying act, and if per-
formance of the act is subject to personal whim, -the invariable aspect
arguably is eliminated.
In Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals, Inc., -the major issue was
whether evidence that Frank Halloran had previously used an immer-
sion coil to heat Freon should be admissible to show that on the day of
the accident he used the coil. The court of appeals unanimously con-
cluded that proof of a deliberate repetitive practice by one in complete
control of the circumstances is highly probative and should be admissi-
ble,24 whether or not proffered to establish negligence.2 5 The party
offering -the evidence, however, must prove sufficient instances of the
conduct to warrant its characterization as a habit or regular usage.26
The court's distinction between evidence of individual prior acts
and evidence of habit is determinative. When negligence is at issue,
Id. at 197-98 (emphasis added). Due to the fact that the circumstances involved in
one's boarding a moving car are variable and not all within the boarder's control, e.g.,
the driver of the car applying the brakes and otherwise controlling the speed and
direction of the street car, it would be difficult to match circumstances of the accident
with circumstances of prior boardings. Even if the boarder had acted in accordance with
his habit and even if his habit were a careless one, there are still too many other factors
involved in the circumstances to admit this evidence to prove that boarder's negligence
either caused or contributed to the accident. On the occasion of the accident the boarder's
act of boarding the street car while it was still moving may not have been an imprudent
one. Warner v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 44 N.Y. 465, 472 (1871) (evidence of flagman's
former intemperate "habits" not admissible to show that he was negligent on the date
of the accident).
22. Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Testimony of the
religious "habits" of the accused, offered as tending to show that he was at home
observing the Sabbath and not out obtaining money through larceny by trick, was
excluded. "[TMhe very volitional basis of the activity raises serious questions as to its
invariable nature, and hence its probative value." Id. at 272.
23. Id. Naturally the invariable requirement of habit evidence also demands that
there be an absence of volition on the part of a person who asserts a habit offensively.
The Levin case demonstrates the possible misuse of any habit evidence and emphasizes
the importance of the invariability standard.
24. 41 N.Y.2d at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 995-96, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
25. Id. at 391, 361 N.E.2d at 995, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
26. Id. at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 996, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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the court agreed with the case law27 that evidence of isolated, prior
acts is not admissible to create an inference that such conduct was re-
peated at the time in question.28 However, if the acts constitute a
"habit," they are admissible. By implicitly adopting Wigmore's defini-
tion of habit as conduct of invariable regularity the court disagreed
with the looser definition of habit used by previous courts.2 9 Zucker v.
Whitridg0 and Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City & Newton R.R. Co.0 1 are
the two seminal New York cases holding that evidence of habit may
not be offered in negligence cases to prove that the person acted in
conformity with his habit on a particular occasion. However, Judge
Breitel ,distinguished those cases by pointing out that the plaintiff's
activity in each case did not constitute a "habit" in the Wigmore
sense. The testimony concerning Zucker's careful approach of the rail-
road tracks when he was with his friend and the evidence of the
plaintiff's habit of jumping on moving street cars in Eppendorf are
not sufficient to establish habit; "[o]n no view, under traditional anal-
ysis, can conduct involving not only oneself but particularly other per-
sons or independently controlled instrumentalities produce a regular
usage because of the likely variation of the circumstances in which
such conduct will be indulged. '32
The opinion does not cite any cases as examples of conduct that
would constitute a habit. Because of the nature of the circumstances,
Halloran's practice of using an immersion coil may qualify as habitual,
provided there are sufficient prior instances of the conduct. Halloran
was in complete control, unlike the plaintiffs in Zucker and Eppendorf.
His practice was deliberate and had been repeated on many occasions
in the course of his trade as a mechanic. From his testimony regarding
his practice of accelerating slow-flowing Freon, Judge Breitel deduced
that Halloran followed a routine in servicing the units and stated that
if part of the routine was the use of an immersion coil, the jury should
be allowed to consider such evidence.33
Halloran was the only eyewitness to the accident. As the plaintiff
in a strict liability action, Halloran has only to prove that the product
27. Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912); Eppendorf v. Brooklyn
City & N. R.R., 69 N.Y. 195 (1877); Warner v. New York Cent. R.R., 44 N.Y. 465
(1871); Grenadier v. Surface Transp. Corp. of N.Y., 271 A.D. 460, 66 N.Y.S.2d 130
(1946); Lefcourt v. Jenkinson, 258 A.D. 1080, 18 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1940).
28. 41 N.Y.2d at 391, 361 N.E.2d at 995, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
29. See, e.g., Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City & N. R.R., 69 N.Y. 195 (1877).
30. 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912).
31. 69 N.Y. 195 (1877).




did not perform as intended and to exclude all causes of the accident
not attributable to the defendant. If he meets this burden, the fact
finder may infer that the accident could have occurred only through
some defect in the product or its packaging, and the court may hold
the defendant liable, even though no defect has been found.24 If the
evidence of the immersion coil is presented and the jury finds that
Halloran used one the day he was injured, then Halloran will be unable
to eliminate all possible causes of the accident not attributable to
Virginia Chemicals. Judge Breitel hinted at the significance to plain-
tiff's case of excluding this evidence: "Of course, had an immersion
heating coil been used at the time of the accident the unexplained and
thus far unexplainable explosion would have been fully explained."3 5
The thermometer allegedly used by Halloran was not introduced in
evidence or otherwise accounted for at trial. This might have been an
unsettling circumstance taken into account by the court of appeals in
its decision to admit the defense witness's testimony, if substantiated.
The introduction of the thermometer would have supported Hallo-
ran's alleged practice of using it to safely heat slow cans of Freon.
There is an alternative ground supporting the admissibility of the
testimony. Halloran testified concerning his practice of accelerating
Freon on direct examination; the court of appeals determined that
this made his practice a material issue of -the case 6 to which contra-
dictory evidence is permitted even if solely for the purpose of impeach-
ing Halloran's credibility.37 Thus the evidence offered by the defense
witness -that Halloran used an immersion coil on several prior occa-
sions will be admissible on a second ground, if it is offered to refute
plaintiff's stated practice. Therefore, the court need not have con-
sidered the question of the admissibility of habit evidence at all.
The court declared that "the statement that evidence of habit or
regular usage is never admissible to establish negligence is too broad"38
and then determined when such evidence will be admissible to prove
negligence. The threshold requirements (before substantiation be-
comes an issue) are that the habit involve conduct of invariable regu-
larity, and that the person exercising his or her habit have complete
control of the circumstances. Adhering to these stringent requirements
34. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 662, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
35. 41 N.Y.2d at 390, 361 N.E.2d at 994, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
36. Id. at 393, 361 N.E.2d at 996-97, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 346-47.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 392, 361 N.E.2d at 995, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46.
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will preclude confusion of evidence resembling that offered in both
Zucker and Eppendorf with habit evidence.
Narrowing the definition of habit has the effect of increasing the
potential admissibility of habit evidence to show negligence on a spe-
cific occasion. Before this redefinition, habit evidence was subsumed by
prior specific acts of care and was inadmissible if offered to create an
inference of negligence on a specific occasion under Zucker and Eppen-
dorf. Judge Breitel's establishment of the identity of habit evidence, as
distinct from evidence of prior specific acts of care, prevents future
confusion of the two. e
Admitting evidence of habit to infer negligence may be a con-
scious step by the New York courts in the direction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule 406 on Habit and Routine Practice
reads: "Evidence of the habit of a person ... whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove
that the conduct of the person ... on a particular occasion was in con-
formity with the habit or routine practice." The Advisory Committee
Comment following this rule states that the rule adopts Wigmore's
definition of habit as conduct involving invariable regularity.
Admitting habit evidence as indicium of a party's negligence on a
specific occasion may reduce the imbalance of -the scales presently
weighted in favor of plaintiffs in strict product liability actions. A
plaintiff situated similarly to Halloran will have more difficulty elimi-
nating all possible causes of the accident not attributable to the de-
fendant. Defendants will be likely to probe very diligently into the
plaintiff's prior use of their product to discover any improper use po-
tentially admissible as a negligent habit. Even if the use of habit evi-
dence does not become a strong defensive weapon in strict product lia-
bility actions, Halloran, at least, will prevent plaintiffs from shielding
evidence of their negligent habits that may have contributed to the
accident.
KATHLEEN ANNE DRUMM
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